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Blunt Honesty, Incentives, and Knowledge Exchange
Bruce Knuteson∗
We propose a simple mechanism to facilitate the buying and selling of useful, bluntly honest infor-
mation. The for-profit, arm’s length knowledge exchange this mechanism enables may dramatically
increase the pace of scientific progress.
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I. MOTIVATION
The past two decades have witnessed an explosion
of valuable information [1] easily accessible to billions
of people. The breadth and depth of quality informa-
tion available for free, at your fingertips with just a few
keystrokes, is breathtakingly world changing. Extraor-
dinary examples of individuals and organizations freely
sharing information to propel advances in science, indus-
try, design, and human well-being are all around. In-
formation hoarding by companies and elites is rapidly
disappearing in an era of increasing and unprecedented
transparency. Information, which has always wanted to
be free, is. Content providers, forced into a greater re-
liance on advertising revenue, maintain a clear line be-
tween advertisements and the objective integrity of jour-
nalistic content. This remarkable transition in the way
information is produced and disseminated is one of the
most profound in recent human history, and one with
powerful implications for our future. After thousands of
years of backbreaking labor, we now live and work in an
Information Economy.
Moreover, we live in an Information Economy in which
information is free.
Against this backdrop, this article’s purpose is limited
and superficially regressive. We point out a small sub-
set of information exchange in which both parties may
benefit from the exchange not being free. The scenario
in Section II illuminates this limited subset of informa-
tion exchange while simultaneously motivating a protocol
designed to facilitate such exchanges. Section III summa-
rizes.
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II. Q&A
Scientist A, who recently discovered an interesting,
not-yet-published property of a particular molecule,
hears through the grapevine that her discovery might be
valuable to Scientist Q, who has been working for years
to develop a cure for a rare disease [2]. The two scientists
Q and A work in different fields, do not know each other,
and have no common contacts.
A wants to sell her knowledge to Q for $100K. Q will
happily pay $100K for any information likely to help
her complete her ambitious research program. The obvi-
ous transaction, unfortunately, is problematic. Before Q
agrees to pay $100K for A’s information, Q wants some
guarantee of the usefulness and accuracy of A’s informa-
tion. The only way A can convince Q the information
is worth paying for is by telling Q the information. If A
tells Q the information before the transaction is agreed
upon, Q has no reason to agree to the transaction. Both
Q and A understand all of this, so A never approaches
Q with her discovery, Q gets hit by a bus on a sunny
afternoon two months later, the cure nearly within Q’s
grasp goes undiscovered for another fifteen years, and
some ten thousand people and their families worldwide,
including someone you love, suffer unnecessarily during
the intervening decade and a half.
Our society’s existing procedures for dealing with cases
like this, often involving legal contracts, can be expensive
to construct, monitor, and enforce. Perhaps we can de-
vise something better.
To assure Q of the usefulness of A’s information, Q and
A can agree that Q is interested in an answer to the ques-
tion “What molecule will enable the following reaction?”
Important details are clarified in a couple of accompany-
ing paragraphs. Q and A agree that a valid answer must
be “a molecule, fully specified in its structure.” Agreeing
on the category of valid answers is very important to Q,
who has no desire to pay $100K to be told the answer is
“a molecule similar in character to one that can be found
in the excrement of some insects” – which, while perhaps
true, is of little use to Q. Q and A agree on a third party,
X, who will decide whether A’s answer falls within the
agreed upon category of allowed possible answers.
Q will only agree to the transaction if she considers
A’s incentives to be well aligned with providing a bluntly
honest answer [3]. A must have some skin in the game. A
must be rewarded if correct, and penalized if incorrect [4].
The social and reputational incentives guiding the ac-
tions of individuals can be difficult to understand, and
harder still to engineer. Anonymizing Q and A conve-
2niently mitigates these incentives. Nobody other than
X, who brokers the transaction between Q and A, needs
to know the identities of Q and A (or their agents). This
anonymization is liberating, allowing Q to ask questions
without worrying about appearing ignorant, and allow-
ing A to provide a bluntly honest answer without having
to worry about delivering insult or saving face.
With social and reputational incentives thus sidelined,
money is the natural carrot and stick. A must lose money
if she is wrong and make money if she is right. For this
to work, Q and A must agree up front on a date D by
which the correctness of A’s answer will be determined,
and X must hold money from Q and A in escrow.
X, who is generally competent but not omniscient,
lacks the resources necessary to determine whether A’s
answer is correct. X must outsource this task, demanding
accompanying evidence sufficient to convince X beyond
reasonable doubt. X cannot outsource this task to A,
who has a clear incentive to claim her answer is correct.
However, provided the question is one for which Q will
be able to verify the accuracy of any answer received, X
can reasonably outsource this task to Q. At the start of
the transaction, X thus demands from Q an additional
deposit that will be returned to Q if, by the agreed upon
date D, Q informs X of the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of
any answer received, providing enough evidence to con-
vince X beyond reasonable doubt.
With Q and X thus responsible for determining the
correctness of A’s answer, A will rationally mistrust the
game and decline to play if Q or X can make money
from A’s loss. X must therefore make the same amount
whether A’s answer turns out to be right or wrong, and Q
must pay the same amount whether A’s answer turns out
to be right or wrong. Q, who consults doctors, lawyers,
accountants, mechanics, and other experts when needed,
is familiar with the concept of paying the same amount
whether A’s answer turns out to be right or wrong.
With X responsible for determining whether Q gets her
deposit back, Q will rationally mistrust the game and de-
cline to play if X can make more money by denying the
sufficiency of the evidence Q provides. X must there-
fore agree up front to take a fixed fee. The amount X
makes cannot depend on whether X approves or denies
Q’s claim, nor on whether Q claims A’s answer is right
or wrong.
In some cases, satisfying the above constraints will re-
sult in money that cannot be given to Q, A, or X. They
agree up front to donate any such money to charity [5].
Putting some simple numbers to this story may help
give it substance. Q gives X $100, plus an additional $100
deposit. A gives X $50, together with A’s answer to Q’s
question. X passes A’s answer along to Q, respecting the
anonymity of both Q and A. X pockets $50 for brokering
the transaction [6]. There are now three possibilities.
• On or before date D, Q informs X that A’s answer
is correct, providing sufficient evidence to convince
X beyond reasonable doubt. X returns Q’s $100
deposit. X returns A’s $50. X pays A an additional
$50.
• On or before date D, Q informs X that A’s answer
is wrong, providing sufficient evidence to convince
X beyond reasonable doubt. X returns Q’s $100
deposit. X sends $100 to charity.
• Date D passes without Q getting back to X, or with-
out Q providing sufficient justification to convince
X beyond reasonable doubt. X returns A’s $50. X
sends $150 to charity.
A’s incentives are straightforward. A makes $50 if she
is right. A loses $50 if she is wrong. A is incentivized to
enter into the transaction only if she is pretty sure she is
right.
X’s incentives are similarly straightforward. X gets $50
whether A is right or wrong, and whether or not Q sub-
mits a claim with evidence sufficient for X to approve.
X, whose business depends on brokering future informa-
tion exchanges, is incentivized to objectively weigh Q’s
evidence, and to do whatever is necessary to ensure trans-
actions proceed smoothly and efficiently.
Q’s incentives are also straightforward. Q pays $100
for her answer whether A is right or wrong. Q has no
economic incentive to claim A’s answer is wrong. Q has
an economic incentive (her $100 deposit) to inform X of
the accuracy of the answer she received, but no economic
incentive [7] to lie about the accuracy of that answer. If
Q is unable to verify the accuracy of the answer received,
Q does have an economic incentive (her $100 deposit) to
make something up and provide fake evidence to support
it, but this is balanced by X, who has the power to ap-
prove or deny Q’s claim, and whose continuing business
interest relies on her consistently and objectively assess-
ing the quality of the evidence Q provides.
An even more straightforward case is obtained if Q
can specify up front how the accuracy of A’s answer is
to be determined. Suppose Q lays out a simple proce-
dure, easily followed by X, for determining the accuracy
of any answer Q receives. Further suppose Q, X, and A
all agree, up front, that X will follow this procedure to
determine the accuracy of whatever answer A provides.
X, who no longer needs Q to eventually say whether A’s
answer is accurate, can go ahead and return Q’s $100
deposit. Moreover, with Q playing no further role in the
adjudication process, it is fine to give Q her money back
if A turns out to be wrong. That is, if Q can specify up
front, to the satisfaction of A and X, exactly how X will
determine the accuracy of A’s answer, then X makes $50
and A stands to make or lose $50, as above, but there is
no need for the charity, and Q gets all of her money back
if A turns out to be wrong.
This simple protocol thus interlocks the self-interested
individuals Q, A, and X in a manner facilitating the
transfer of useful, bluntly honest information from A to
Q. In this particular scenario, Q tests the answer pro-
vided by A, A turns out to be correct, money changes
3hands as prescribed, a cure is obtained, and the quality
of many lives dramatically improves.
III. SUMMARY
This article has identified a subset of information ex-
change in which both parties may benefit from the ex-
change not being free. The subset identified [8] are ex-
changes that can be cast as simple questions with an eas-
ily agreed upon set of possible answers for which Q will
eventually be able to inform X of the accuracy of any
answer received. Clear specification of the category of
allowed possible answers before the transaction protects
Q against receiving an answer that is true but unhelpful.
Restricting questions to those for which Q will eventu-
ally be able to verify the accuracy of any answer received
allows the use of an information exchange protocol, de-
scribed in Section II, designed to incentivize the transfer
of useful, bluntly honest information from A to Q, bro-
kered by X.
The protocol attempts to align, with robustness suit-
able for practical use, the incentives of very human buy-
ers and sellers of information. The resulting alignment,
although imperfect, may represent a significant improve-
ment on the incentives created by other communication
channels. The protocol does not guarantee correct an-
swers, but it does make it costly for A to provide an
incorrect answer. The protocol relies on a central adju-
dicator X, but limits her role to approving the evidence
backing the claim eventually provided by Q, and provides
a strong and clear economic motivation for X to consis-
tently and objectively weigh the evidence put in front of
her. Q is motivated to ask a clear question that will elicit
an answer helpful to her. A is motivated to carefully con-
sider the question and provide an accurate answer within
the specified category of valid possible answers. The pro-
tocol itself is little more than a few rules, of roughly the
same level of complexity as a typical board game, that
create and enforce a simple incentive structure [9].
We hope the paid knowledge exchange developed in
this article may supplement, in some small but useful
way, the vast trove of information that has already been
unleashed by our remarkably vibrant, mostly honest, and
ostensibly wondrously robust Free Information Economy.
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